(MEADS Air and Missile Defence system)

Abstract

Induction of new technologies has dramatically impacted the 21th century battlefield. Many previous ideas and concepts are being revised, reassessed or even being abandoned altogether. Significant increase in the precision, range and lethality of indirect fires, proliferation of highly capable cruise and ballistic missiles, affordability of destructive air power, coupled with ever more capable ISTAR complexes (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance) leveraging ubiquitous availability of sensors has made Force Protection an extremely difficult and challenging endeavour. As the most prominent aspect of Force Protection, In today’s operational environment the importance of Air and Missile defence cannot be overstated. This article analyses the Bangladesh Army’s need for Air and Missile defence and recommends course of action.

Introduction

In the strategic context of Bangladesh Armed Forces, due to lack of sufficient numbers of modern 4th gen fighter interceptors in the fleet, significant gap and lack of balance in air power prevails between BAF and other regional Air Forces. Making joint Active Air and Missile Defence, the primary viable mean of effective defensive counterair in the short to medium term. Moreover in the long term, when it comes to fighting a conventionally and numerically superior adversary against whom Air superiority cannot be achieved, Active Air and Missile Defence (AMD) capabilities will become the lifeline of the friendly formations.

And today for the Army specifically, to ensure Force Protection against traditional fixed and rotary wing threats, cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as to address the increasing RAM and UAS hazards on the battlefield, adequate Air and Missile defence is imperative.

Definitions

Defensive Counterair: defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace.

Force Protection: Measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment, materiel, operations, and activities from threats and hazards in order to preserve freedom of action and operational effectiveness thereby contributing to mission success.(AJP 3.14)

Air and Missile Defence (AMD) is the most prominent part of it. It is defined as the direct active and passive defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and ballistic missile threats against friendly forces and assets. (JP 3-01)

Active AMD: Active AMD is direct defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and BM threats against friendly forces and assets. Active AMD includes AD and ballistic missile defence (BMD).

AD: AD is defensive measures designed to destroy attacking aircraft and aerodynamic missiles, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. It includes the use of aircraft, SAMs, antiaircraft artillery (AAA), CO, EW (including directed energy), multiple sensors, and other available weapons/capabilities. AD includes defence against CMs and UASs.

BMD: BMD is defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy BMs, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. Integration of BMD systems will allow for a defence in depth, with the potential for multiple engagements that increase the probability for success. (JP 3-01)

Though not included in the definition of active AMD operations, counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) is a fundamental part of active AMD. C-RAM operations are defensive measures to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of rocket, artillery, and mortar (RAM) threats. For, simplicity sake, air, ballistic, and RAM threats are generally referred to as “air and missile threats” hereafter. (FM 3-01)

Passive AMD. Passive AMD is all measures, other than active AMD, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and BM threats against friendly forces and assets. These measures include detection, warning, camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, hardening, and the use of protective construction.

As mentioned above, active AMD is embedded in the defensive counterair portion of the joint counterair operational framework.(JP 3-01)

Bangladesh Army’s Active Air Defence capability requirement.

Current Air Defence Doctrine of Bangladesh limits Army’s Air Defence capabilities to MRSAM class. Only Bangladesh Air Force can procure and possess missiles beyond 30 km.1 Thus, it effectively puts long range AD and BMD within operational responsibilities of BAF. Hence for Army’s active AD, we will focus on MRSAM, VSHORAD/MANPADS and C-RAM capabilities in this article.

Currently, Bangladesh army has 43rd and 44rd SHORAD Regiments equipped with Chinese FM-90 short range Air defence systems.2 Additionally, Army has one battery of operational Oerlikon Skyguard® 3 VSHORAD. Commissioned with Adhoc 48 Air Defence (AD) Regiment Artillery.3 Another battery is presumably on order. Apart from that, Army has procured two batteries of CS/AA3 system that are in commission with Adhoc 57 Air Defence (AD) Regiment Artillery.4

(Bangladesh Army Air Defence Artillery FM-90)

However, these numbers are not nearly enough to conduct sufficient active air and missile defence operation to protect all ten Divisional formations and critical assets of Bangladesh Army in a full fledged conflict. Due to budgetary constraints and political reasons army has a tendency to buy a very small numbers of state of art weapons to declare modernization and then move on. Such as, Oerlikon Skyguard 3 VSHORAD can be considered best in its class, however, just one or two batteries are going to have very little effect in a large conventional ground combat operation. Army must extensively prioritize Air defence Artillery modernisation as it did with amor and mechanised infantry modernisation in the previous decade. (For reference, from 2011 to 2020 Army has procured 500+ APCs and MRAPs. Extensively modernised its existing tank fleet and procured two regiments of new state of the art tanks. MBT-2000 and VT-5).

MRSAM requirement

Russo-Ukraine conflict has widely demonstrated that, to effectively combat enemy cruise missile, medium and large UAS/UCAS, fixed & rotary wing threats in order to protect friendly formations and critical assets, state of art area defence capable MRSAM systems are crucial. Western supplied MRSAM systems such as NASAMS and IRIS-T SLM has shown remarkable performance.5 One NASAMS unit has reportedly shot down more than 250 targets alone.6

(HISAR O+)

So far Army lacks any MRSAM system in active service. However, recently it appears under the MRSAM evaluation process the service has taken steps in the right direction.7 It has been reported that Army has ordered HISAR O+ MRSAM from Türkiye in 2021 under a billion dollars contract.8 We highly recommend Army continue its MRSAM purchases in batches. It must raise at least 4x MRSAM Regiments by 2030 and 8x by 2035.

VSHORAD/MANPADS requirement

MANPADS is an integrated part of maneuverer formation’s air defence. Currently Bangladesh Army operates several types of MANPADS. Including FN-16, QW-2 & recently procured more advanced QW-18A. Additionally, Army has taken initiative to manufacture MANPADS locally and open a domestic production line within BOF to fulfil future requirement. However, it should be treated with caution.9 Previously, a similar attempt in mid 2010s with local assembly of FN-16 has failed. But if this one were to succeed, it would require extensive cooperation and successful ToT from International security partners. This project, if realised, will not only enhance the domestic defence industry and build local expertise, but will also offer flexibility in procurement and help to save foreign currencies. Alternatively, if this fails to deliver, army should have contingency plan to procure MANPADS off the shelf in sufficient numbers for future requirement.

(Roketsan Sungur MANPADS)

C-UAS and C-RAM requirements

C-UAS: Today proliferation of small unmanned areal systems (UAS) has evolved into a much more significant and dynamic threat than it was previously anticipated. Ukraine conflict is demonstrating how small, cheap (and mostly) commercial drones are procured in tens of thousands and fielded with platoon and even done to squad level formations. These are creating unprecedented sensor density and offering dramatic localised situational awareness to the smallest units. Something like that was almost unthinkable just two decades ago. To make it worse, these quadcopter, Octocopter, and FPV UAS has been increasingly adopted and modified to carry Grenades and small ammunitions. And they are accurately hitting entrenched positions, infantry and armoured vehicles.10 Which has become a major problem for force protection.

Additionally, more sophisticated and capable purpose-built loitering ammunitions like Switchblade-600 and Lancet-3 with longer range, endurance and higher lethality are being extensively used against soft and armoured targets to a great effect. Moreover, high-end version of these loitering ammunitions like Israeli Harop, with more payload, hours of endurance and ability to traverse hundreds of km has been able to hit high value targets (HVT) throughout the adversary’s operational depth, as seen in 2020 Nagarno-Karabakh war and ongoing Ukraine-Russia conflict.11

Last but not the least, tactical UAVs like Russian Orlan-10 and Ukrainian Shark are greatly enhancing the field commander’s situational awareness by providing persistence ISR throughout the depth and breadth of the battlefield. These systems are cost effective and easy to produce in numbers, thus attritable. Consequentially, this class of UAV along with smaller ones has become a significant force multiplier for the traditional Artillery, enabling a highly devastating Reconnaissance-strike-complex (RSC) by providing target acquisition with unprecedented scale and accuracy.12

Even though these are yet to pick up on trends fully in South Asia, it would be wrong to assume that other regional armed forces would fail to keep up with the unprecedented changes that are taking place today. Indian army has already began investing gradually in small indigenous UAS and loitering ammunitions. Previously IAF bought undisclosed numbers of Harop loitering ammunition from Israel.13

Soon Bangladesh Army’s Air defence Artillery will need to address these newly emerging threats. Although, there is No doubt EW will play a large role in defending against these, nevertheless kinetic interceptors are essential. However, Recent conflicts in Ukraine and Nagarno-karabakh has demonstrated the inability of traditional Air defence systems (even the advanced ones) to adequately address the threat posed by small UAVs and loitering ammunitions. Even without taking into account the difficulties to detect, track and identify these threats due to their small RCS and very low IR signature, a very simple cost-benefit analysis will show the serious inefficiency of traditional of defence systems. A short range interceptor or MANPADS cost higher than these UAS. For comparison, loitering ammunitions like Lancet or Orlan-10 type UAVs only cost around $35k-100k. Let alone smaller quadcopters and FPV UAS, which costs much less. Usually between $1000-10k. On the other hand, an FIM-92 Stinger MANPADS reportedly costing up to $400k today.

Although world leading armed forces are seeking solutions to this problem in next generation directed energy weapons, those are at least a decade away from being fielded in large numbers. Besides, with the limited budget it has, Army is unlikely to get its hand on such high-end laser weapon systems in sufficient numbers. Alternatively, cold war Era concept of radar guided AAA guns are getting renewed attention. These VSHOARAD are cost effective when dealing with emerging UAS and loitering ammunitions threats. Ukraine has used and continue to use its large numbers of donated Gepard SPAAG to a great effect against shahed-136 and other Russian UAS.14

C-RAM: As discussed above, the ubiquitous availability of highly attritable and high-fidelity surveillance and reconnaissance assets, from electronic and multispectral sensing, to video feeds from UAVs, leaves little room to hide.

Even though it is rare that any one weapon or technology will alter the totality of the battlefield, as results are dependent upon so many different factors that defy effective centralised control, the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) provided to Ukraine have disrupted this trend and decisively shaped the battlefield by engaging Russia’s logistics, command and control(C2) nodes, and troop concentrations through much of the Russian Armed Force’s (RuAF) operational depth. This has prevented the RuAF from concentrating and massing artillery fire in a way that the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) could not match, disrupted RuAF attempts to concentrate forces for offensives, and made command of Russian units a risky endeavour. Without the above effects, the AFU would have suffered significantly greater casualties and setbacks. The value of GMLRS is best understood through a combination of software, hardware and tactics.15

Additionally, AFU used US supplied Exculiber 155mm high precision round to strike Russian HVT in the rear. These tube and Rocket artillery capabilities are being continuously improved.

In potential future conflicts, competent adversary can leverage long range precision IDF to similar effects against Bangladesh Army through robust kill chain and capable Reconnaissance-strike complex. Evidently, there is no sanctuary in modern warfare. The enemy can strike throughout operational depth. Dispersion and concealment of ammunitions stocks, command and control (C2) nodes are critical to its survivability, nevertheless active C-RAM capability is imperative.

(Aselsan Korkut SPAAG)

Today’s New generation Self propelled AAA guns meets the requirements and provide effective solution to C-UAS and C-RAM as it combines both capabilities in a single system. For example, Reinmetall Skyranger-35 and Aselsan Korkut. (C-RAM capability for the later is still in development) Additionally, these systems have excellent utility against Cruise missiles and other areal threats in point defence role.

Even though Bangladesh Army has already bought Skygaurd 3 Air defence system from Reinmetall, it is unlikely to afford something expensive as Skyranger-35. However, Aselsan Korkut is more cost effective and may offer a better solution to the Army. The service must look to procure 20x systems in class by 2035.

Air and Missile Defence integration requirement.

Proper integration within service and between services is crucial to the operational success of Air and Missile defence. Integration maximizes the capabilities of individual systems and compensate for its vulnerabilities by combining different sensors, interceptors and decision makers into a single network enabled redundant architecture. Each system having access to the combined air picture allows Early Warning, better readiness, and efficient engagement of threats.

As of now Bangladesh Army lacks any initiative of its own to integrate its sensors. However, BAF has previously initiated a project for its own air and missile defence’s system integration. The system manufactured by Artemis from UK has entered service this year. It is expected to support multiple protocols. that means the system will have the capability to integrate equipments from different manufactures.16 Though, BAF has procured only one system so far.

Army’s recent Re-evaluation of Local Warning Radar (LWR) notice suggest that, the service is looking for within and inter service integration of its air defence assets.17 To facilitate smooth joint integration, Army may look to procure the same system as BAF. And both services should look to procure multiple of them to gain operational flexibility and ensure redundancy and survivability.

EW capability requirement

Russo-Ukraine war has seen widespread employment of Electronic Warfare capabilities in both offensive and defensive actions. EW has proven to be the most effective and primary mean to counter small UAS. Reportedly, Russian EW capabilities several months into the conflict has been able to knock out 90% of Ukrainian UAS.18

Similarly, it has demonstrated high performance against US supplied precision weapons such as Excalibur, HIMARS and JDAM.

By the second year, according to a senior Ukrainian military official. “everything ended: the Russians deployed electronic warfare, disabled satellite signals, and HIMARS became completely ineffective, this ineffectiveness led to the point where a very expensive shell was used” increasingly to strike lower-priority targets. Though Kyiv still considers its HIMARS rockets valuable, but Russian jamming can cause them to miss a target by 50 feet or more. “When it’s, for example, a pontoon bridge … but there’s a 10-meter deviation, it ends up in the water,” another Ukrainian official said.

A battalion commander, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to do so publicly, described flying a reconnaissance drone in foggy conditions last year in Bakhmut to track a HIMARS strike on a Russian position. On his screen, the commander watched in dismay as each rocket missed.19

Additionally, Excalibur precision artillery round initially had an efficiency rate of 70% hitting targets when first used in Ukraine. However, after six weeks efficiency declined to only 6% as the Russians adapted their electronic warfare systems to counter it.20

One of the clear lessons of Ukriane conflict in large scale conventional warfighting is the utility and effectiveness of EW in Air and Missile Defence. It is imperative that Bangladesh Army invest sufficiently in its EW capability and acquire sophisticated GNSS jamming technology.

Passive Air and Missile Defence capability requirement.

Passive Air and Missile Defence techniques are crucial to the survivability of friendly formations and critical assets. Apart from the real possibility of existing active AMD systems being overwhelmed due to focused and saturated attack by the enemy, most Armed forces around the world often lack sufficient numbers of AMD systems to provide active protection to all of its formations. Specially when it comes to BMD and C-RAM. And for Bangladesh Armed forces, it lacks any type of active BMD or C-RAM capability as of now. Hence for Army, passive AMD is the only measure to preserve and protect its formations against these threats. Additionally, its AD capability against air breathing targets is significantly insufficient. Thus, making Passive AMD indispensable across the spectrum.

Passive Air and Missile Defence measures includes–

(1) Detection and Early Warning. Timely detection and warning of air and missile threats provide reaction time to friendly forces to seek shelter or take appropriate actions.(JP 3-01) Specifically when it comes to BMD, long range land based sensors detects the threat when it appears on the horizon, tracks it and calculate the point of impact, subsequently generates alarms. Timely dissemination of these warnings require robust, secure and fast automated communication systems.

Bangladesh army is yet to have any long range sensing capability of its own to detect and track air and missile threats at ranges. Though, Local Warning Radar acquisition initiative is set to change that. As of now, BAF operates variety of long range state of art AESA sensors. That includes, 2x GM403, 1x RAT 31LD, 2x REL-4, 1x JH-16 & 1x JY-11B.21 These system are capable of effectively tracking air and missile threats at ranges. Proper Inter-service AMD system integration would enable Army to leverage these sensors to boost its early warning capability.

(Thales GM400 long range AESA surveillance and early warning radar)

(2) Mobility. Mobility reduces vulnerability and increases survivability by complicating enemy surveillance and reconnaissance effort to pin point locations of targets.(JP 3-01)

In today’s operational environment, anything slow with a sizable signature has become increasingly vulnerable due to unprecedented sensor density (offering persistent reconnaissance across the depth and breadth of the battlefield) coupled with ubiquitous availability of indirect precision fires. This is true for the existing assets and traditional formations across the echolens.

To remain competitive and to preserve its combat power, army must introduce necessary organizational changes and facilitate advanced and adequate trainings to its personnel to enable higher battlefield mobility and agility of its units and formations.

(3) Camouflage and Concealment. Practice of visual signature reduction measures that can “hide” or deny accuracy in locating friendly targets/target systems. These measures may be conducted continuously or in response to specific warnings. Timely intelligence concerning the overflight by enemy satellite and aircraft collection systems is important to the effort. Those measures also may be coupled with deception measures to further complicate chances of effective enemy attacks. The employment of obscurants can negate the effectiveness and/or accuracy of attacks.(JP 3-01)

(Saab’s Barracuda camouflage system on an armoured vehicle)

Modern state of art Multi-spectral camouflage system offers a degree of protection against visual, IR and radar detection. Army should look to procure them in sufficient numbers from international partners and companies that are offering cost effective solutions.

(4) Deception. Deception misleads adversaries by manipulating, distorting, or falsifying friendly actions. Deception may be used to cause an enemy to waste munitions on false targets, deceive their combat assessment process, and falsely influence their decision makers by feeding their intelligence collectors what appears to be credible information. Deception may deny the enemy the ability to gain correct tactical, operational, and strategic information when using their reconnaissance and surveillance systems.(JP 3-01)

(5) Dispersal. Dispersal reduces target vulnerability by decreasing concentration making individual targets less lucrative. Combined with mobility and deception, dispersal increases enemy uncertainty as to whether a particular location is occupied and, if so, whether it will be occupied when the attack is executed.(JP 3-01)

Ability to fight dispersed effectively requires extensive training preparation and adaptation of Mission Command philosophy. Which army needs to accommodate within its training processes.

(6) Hardening and Redundancy.

(a) Hardening. Valuable assets and their shelters must be hardened to protect them against Air and Missile attacks.

(b) Redundancy. A principal means of preserving combat power is duplication of critical nodes, capabilities, and systems that are particularly vulnerable to air and missile attack and for which other passive measures may be less appropriate.(JP 3-01)

Notes–

1. REQUIREMENT OF LOMAD AND HIMAD MISSILE FOR BANGLADESH ARMY: SUITABLE OPTIONS FOR INDUCTION. (by Lieutenant Colonel Tanveer Ahmed, psc, G+) Mirpur Papers volume 28, Issue 32.​

2. Bangladesh Army chief raises flags of 3 new artillery units, Dhaka Tribune.​

3. NEWLY ADDITION IN BANGLADESH ARMY ORELIKON RADAR CONTROLLED GUN TEST FIRING HELD AT COXBAZAR, ISPR.​

4. Bangladesh Army test-fires CS/AA3 anti-aircraft guns, Janes.​

5. ES&T Redaktion (6 June 2024). “ILA 2024: „Close to 100% hit rate” für IRIS-T SLM”. esut.de (in German).​

6. Story of Commander of Norwegian-American NASAMS. The Baron Unit destroyed over 250 Russian missiles & drones – United24​

7.“Evaluation of Medium Range Surface to Air Missile System for Bangladesh Army” (PDF). DGDP.

8.তুরস্কের সঙ্গে সম্পর্ক তলানি থেকে শিখরে, আজকের পত্রিকা / সমরাস্ত্র-কেনাকাটায়-কৌশলী-বাংলাদেশ, সমকাল.

9. https://dgdp.gov.bd/dgdp/AP_TEN/notice/729.pdf

10. FPV drones are defining the battlefield, WavellRoom.

11. Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict: How Baku destroyed Russian S-300s with Israeli suicide drones, Middle East Eye.

12. Ukraine’s Lessons for Future Combat: Unmanned Aerial Systems and Deep Strike. USAWC Press.

13.“Indian air force orders Harop loitering munitions”. Flightglobal.com.

14. Gepard: “Predator” of the Ukrainian air defense, MILITARNYI.

15. MLRS and the Totality of the Battlefield, RUSI.

16. ENHANCEMENT OF AIR DEFENCE CAPABILITY OF BANGLADESH THROUGH UTILIZATION OF BANGABANDHU SATELLITE, Wing Commander M Mahfuzur Rahman, Engineering. Mirpur Papers, Volume 26, Issue 30.

17. Re-evaluation of Local Warning Radar (LWR) notice, DGDP.

18. Russia’s Electronic-Warfare Troops Knocked Out 90 Percent Of Ukraine’s Drones, Forbes.

19. Russian jamming leaves some high-tech U.S. weapons ineffective in Ukraine, The Washington Post.

20. https://www.congress.gov/118/meeting/house/116957/witnesses/HHRG-118-AS35-Wstate-PattD-20240313.pdf

21.https://mod.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/mod.portal.gov.bd/page/7afd70bc_7a61_41e6_9437_c38258a525e8/Air_Force.pd / https://www.latribune.fr/entreprise…es-radars-high-tech-au-bangladesh-852399.html

​

The post Bangladesh Army Modernization Priorities: Part I first appeared on DefenceHub.

Wikipedia has some background information on Type-23; some of the ships have undergone an upgrade (more specifically, an MLU), whereas some of the hulls have just had a Life extension upgrade (overhauling of necessary equipment and machinery to keep the ship operationally safe and sound beyond the planned life). As a result, this page does not contain the common information; instead, refer to Wikipedia.

This is neither the Turkish Navy’s first look at the Type-23, nor is it the Turkish Navy’s first evaluation of a second-hand platform for flotilla extension. Since 2010, many evaluation, inspection, and feasibility studies have been conducted on a number of platforms that are being used by other fleets and are slated for retirement. One well-known instance was adding more Oliver Hazard Perry hulls to the Gabya Class flotilla that was operating as an air defence frigate in the Turkish Navy. Additionally, Type 23 was presented to TN in the 1990s with a unique weaponry package but lost to MEKO 200;

Type 23 with sea zenith was presented to the Turkish Navy in the 1990s
Image Source: Ibrahim Sunnetci

The ship has a special propulsion system that has not been found on TN’s warships up to this point. It is called the CODELOG system, and it consists of two RR gas turbines for reaching high speeds and four diesel gen-sets for cruising at lower speeds. The ship’s air defence and point-defense capabilities aren’t much better than those of the Istanbul Class or the current Gabya-Class. However, Type 23 has more endurance at high sea states than Istanbul Class frigates (Type 23 is predicted to be operational at 6/7 and endurance up to 9) and has a longer autonomous range (7500 compared to 4700 NM).

The ship’s foremost contribution to Turkish Navy would be the most recent active towed, variable depth sonar Sonar 2087 and bow mounted Sonar 2150. And only for this reason, it might make sense for the future LHD Task Force to guard the flotilla from undersea dangers and perform ASW operations in blue waters. There is no immediate need for Sonar 2087 because Aselsan’s DUFAS (Low frequency, variable depth sonar) is undergoing tests and investigations to build a multi-static sonar system for TF-2000 and other platforms, along with sonars mounted on unmanned systems. Although Anadolu LHD is anticipated to enter service by the end of 2023 following rigorous sea testing, there is now a sense of urgency because the building of the Istanbul Class and the Barbaros Class MLU have both been years behind schedule. Moreover, TF2000 is not expected in active service before 2030, Type 23’s could be an interim – urgent solution to save the day, not the tomorrow of TN.

According to the most recent information, Turkish Navy is less likely to purchase Type-23 due to “alienation” to main ship subsystems. To upgrade the Combat Management System with ADVENT, the Fire Control Radar with Aselsan’s AKREP, the Torpedo Decoys with Hzr TAKS’s countermeasures, and the 114mm/30mm weapon systems with MKE 76mm and Aselsan’s stabilised cannons, an upgrade-modernization-commonization approach was contemplated. The platform would be difficult for the Turkish Navy in this situation because it is not possible to change the propulsion system, which is kept standard in the other ships. (Classes in Gabya, MEKO, Ada, and Istanbul employ MTU / LM2500 with largely standard propulsion-related equipment)

If upgraded, Type 23s are not anticipated to enter service before 2024. They are anticipated to be delivered in batches of two, with the first two ships arriving and being upgraded before the next two ships arrive and enter service no earlier than 2026. The Royal Navy, also, does not intend to let go of Type 23 in whole as Russian invasion of Ukraine warms the arctic waters.

The post On premises of flotilla expansion: Turkish Navy evaluates transfer of Royal Navy’s Type-23 (Duke Class) first appeared on DefenceHub.

According to information obtained from numerous trustworthy sources, a new consortium made up of members of STM and TAIS (the latter of which is also a consortium made up of Sefine, Sedef, and Anadolu shipyards) won the tender. Two bidders were the top runners in terms of bid value and evaluation point.

By giving the project to a corporation that is partially state owned—STM—and that has experience on the platform and a financial assurance, it is intended to reduce the risks associated with management and finance, respectively. Additionally, STM performed significant contractor tasks for the F-515, Istanbul frigate and the Ada class corvettes during the contract and detail design phases as well as the construction phase. Additionally, STM is now working on building the Ukrainian Navy Corvette project at RMK Shipyard.

The planned workload is as follows:

STM will be in charge of planning the fitting out and associated purchases of components, dealing with suppliers, and generating and managing technical packages (which were initially required to be supplied at the winner). STM will continue to serve as the main contractor in this case.
The entire construction process will be owned by TAIS members, who will also be in charge of organising subcontractors, raw materials, and supplies. Simultaneous constructions are planned at each member shipyard by shift over a period of several months to ensure that subcontractors operate effectively.

Following the creation of a new consortium, a business that is partially controlled by STM and TAIS, a financial strategy has yet to be defined.

The post STM & TAIS bags the deal: construction of 6th, 7th and 8th Milgem ships will commence soon first appeared on DefenceHub.

Militaries are utilising AI in a number of ways, including the development of autonomous weapons systems, the use of drones for missile strikes and reconnaissance, and cyberwarfare. Drones incorporating AI capabilities may function independently and make judgements without assistance from humans. UAVs are the most obvious examples of autonomous weapons systems that may function without human intervention, potentially enhancing the speed and effectiveness of military operations. AI is also being utilised to enhance cyber defence systems, assisting in the prevention of cyberattacks and maintaining the security of important military data.

The way wars are fought and won is changing because of AI. Today’s  AI’s sophisticated capabilities are enabling militaries to function more effectively and efficiently, ushering in a new era of warfare. Militaries are  getting new tools and approaches to handle the challenges of modern combat thanks to the employment of AI in drones, autonomous weapons systems, and cyberwarfare. 

Drone use is one of the most significant applications of artificial intelligence in the military. Drones having AI capabilities may function independently and make judgements without assistance from humans. Drones are perfect for reconnaissance and missile strikes because AI enables them to fly autonomously, navigate challenging situations, and avoid obstructions. Drones can detect and track targets by analysing data and making judgements based on that analysis with the aid of AI.

The use of AI in drones has several benefits for military operations. Since drones can fly for longer periods of time and cover more land than regular aircraft, efficiency is one of the biggest benefits. They can therefore acquire data more rapidly and comprehensively than human pilots. AI also enables autonomous decision-making for drones, eliminating the need for human oversight. This may result in quicker reaction times and less danger to human pilots. As AI can evaluate data and make judgements based on that data, it can help identify and track targets more precisely, which is another benefit of utilising AI in drones. Furthermore, drones with sophisticated AI can now independently strike targets, something which has been a cause for concern in recent years. 

The use of AI in unmanned vehicles doesn’t just apply to aerial vehicles. land and sea vehicles are also beginning to use AI. Unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) and unmanned surface vehicles (USV) are beginning to use AI not only for target recognition, but also for swarm operations. This can be labelled as swarm intelligence, where unmanned vehicles can communicate, navigate and perform combat operations in unison, using the shared data to operate as efficiently as possible. Of course, this swarm capability is also a trend which is prevalent in UAVs, such as the STM Kargu.

5th gen fighters are using AI to increase both combat effectiveness and pilot safety. AI enables the data picked up by an assortment of sensors to be quickly assessed and presented to the pilot for unparalleled situational awareness. With the advent of loyal wingman projects, the use of AI in fighter jets will become even more important, as multiple UAVs will need to communicate with a fighter jet in dynamic and dangerous situations, both providing physical protection and enhanced awareness of threats. Fighter jets such as the F-35 and upcoming TFX can land autonomously in the event where a pilot passes out.

The Baykar Bayraktar Kizilelma drone presents a brand new use case for sophisticated AI. Unlike other drones, the Kizilelma is much more like a fighter jet. Not only can it target other aircraft, but it can also perform aggressive manoeuvres. It will be able to operate in GPS denied airspace and under electronic warfare attacks. Therefore, it will heavily rely on AI for operations in areas where communications are cut.

AI is used in a variety of weapon systems such as close range air defence systems, tank turrets and RCWS. The use of AI in such systems enables for quick and accurate targeting of enemy vehicles and troops. The AI can facilitate the tracking of targets, including trajectory predictions based on target speed and direction. 

AI is also employed in cyberwarfare to thwart cyberattacks and safeguard vital military data. Artificial intelligence (AI)-powered systems can be used to quickly identify and respond to cyberthreats, including seeing and thwarting prospective assaults before they can do any harm. AI can also be used to analyse vast amounts of data and spot trends, potentially revealing network weaknesses. AI can also be used to develop “honeypots” or fake assets in order to divert attackers’ attention away from the real valuable assets.

A variety of benefits for military operations come from the employment of AI in cyberwarfare. Increased security is one of the biggest benefits because AI-powered systems can identify and address cyber threats instantly. As a result, potential assaults can be recognised and countered before they have a chance to cause harm, maintaining the security of important military data. Additionally, the use of AI in cyberwarfare enables quicker response times because AI systems can quickly spot patterns in massive amounts of data and evaluate them for possible network flaws.

Future military applications of AI are probably going to be substantially more sophisticated as AI technology develops. AI-powered systems might be utilised, for instance, to command entire battlefields and make tactical decisions in real-time. Additionally, as cyberattacks get more sophisticated, the use of AI in cyberwarfare is anticipated to become more prevalent. 

The post From Drones to Cyber Warfare: The Military Applications of AI first appeared on DefenceHub.

Under the leadership of Ataturk, Turkiye began manufacturing aircraft in the 1920s. By the 1940s, Turkiye had a flourishing array of indigenous aircraft designs. Unfortunately, the arrival of the 1950s spelled the end of the Turkish aviation industry. The Marshall Plan and the admission into NATO caused irreparable harm to the progression of local aircraft programs and the Turkish defence industry at the time. All progress was gone. It was only in the 1970s that the Turkish defence industry restarted due to arms embargoes. Since then, each decade has been full of steady progress. In preparation for the hundredth year of the Republic, major Turkish defence projects have been hastened. This includes four jet-powered aircraft, three of which are purpose-built combat platforms.

Turkish Aerospace TFX

The TFX is a 5+ generation twin-engine stealth air superiority fighter that will eventually replace the F-16 as Turkiye’s primary fighter jet. Originally intended to accompany the F-35 in order to make up for the F-35’s drawbacks, the TFX is shaping up to be an F-22 on steroids. Preliminary specifications suggest that it may outperform both the F-22 and F-35, which is not surprising as the TFX will likely serve as the basis for a 6th gen fighter further down the line. The TFX is the largest of all 5th gen fighters, with a length of 21 metres. Its engine nozzles are wide apart in order to accommodate a sizeable rear-facing sensor package. This almost SU-57-like rear end is perhaps the most notable difference between the prototype and the concept mock-up. The TFX’s first flight has been pushed back from 2025 to 2023.

“The first flight was planned for 2025. Instead, it will fly at the end of 2023.”

CEO of Turkish Aerospace, Temel kotil

The TFX has a much larger nose than its rivals, which has led to speculations about its radar. Some have dubbed it a “stealth AWACS” due to the large radar housing, which could host 2000+ GaN T/R modules. Along with side and rear radar and a slew of other sensors, the TFX’s enormous frontal radar will give it an immense advantage in air-to-air combat.

Turkish Aerospace TİSU

The TİSU, codenamed Anka III, is perhaps one of the most elusive programs in the Turkish defence industry. Spotted years ago in an infographic, it was only officially revealed recently. It is an unmanned stealth flying-wing bomber.

Its flying-wing design and roof intakes mean that it is optimised for deep bombing missions. It prioritises stealth and internal payload capacity over manoeuvrability and speed.

With the advent of the KERKES project, Turkish drones can operate in GPS-denied airspace. This is important for the TİSU, as it can fulfil its role even against a force with advanced jamming capabilities. This would include predetermined high-value targets such as bunkers, command centres, hangars, ammunition depots and runways, along with dynamic targets such as tanks and air defence systems, which the AI could autonomously target.

The TİSU is expected to perform its first flight in March-April.

Baykar Kızılelma

Baykar’s Kizilelma is the first of its kind. This sleek aircraft bridges the gap between traditional fixed-wing drones and fighter aircraft. Once ready, it will be a carrier-capable stealth multirole unmanned fighter. Its design is geared towards high maneuverability with its canards, a departure from all other UCAVs. It’s clear that Baykar is betting big on AI with the Kizilelma, and it may just pay off in the end.

Having made its first flight on December 14, the Kizilelma represents not only a milestone for Baykar, but also a giant leap forward for the Turkish defence industry. Its maiden flight represents the dawn of the jet age for the Turkish military aviation industry.

The Kizilelma is expected to enter the inventory before 2025, essentially acting as a stop-gap fighter before the introduction of the TFX. Like the infamous TB2, the Kizilelma is a far cheaper alternative to manned combat aircraft. It offers some 5th gen fighter capabilities at a price lower than most 4th gen fighters. This presents a budget option for smaller militaries. More interestingly, it is a highly economical force multiplier for serious militaries. It can be unleashed upon an enemy airforce and act as a “sky terminator” which relentlessly hunts down enemy fighter jets in contested airspace. Such an attack by a group of Kizilelmas would send enemy fighters into disarray. Alternatively, the Kizilelma could be used for targeting helicopters, AEW&C, cargo planes and drones, allowing manned 5th gen fighters to focus on other fighter jets.

Conclusion

Turkish military aviation is advancing at a pace reminiscent of US-USSR aerospace competition in the Cold War. The sanctions, embargoes and removal from the F-35 program have only strengthened Turkiye’s defence industry. Thus it can be said that the Anti-Turkish lobbyists in Washington have shot themselves in the foot.

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A memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed between BDL (Bharat Dynamics Limited) and Dassault on the 20th of October 2022 concerning the integration onto the Rafale fighter aircraft of two significant platforms currently produced and further maturing within India.

The integration pertains to:

1) The Astra BVR (beyond visual range) missile. The current (mark 1) system has a range of 110 kilometres to complement its datalink and high probability kill active radar seeker. Future variants (mark 2 and mark 3) research and development are underway and will improve upon these features significantly.

2) The SAAW (Smart anti airfield weapon) munition. The current system has a circular error probable (CEP) accuracy of less than 7 metres aided by the GAGAN (GPS augmented navigation) network and its Infrared (IIR) seeker. Future variants such as the EO-SAAW are expected to improve these features significantly with CEP of < 3 metres and dual seeker with millimetre wave (MMW) imaging to complement IIR.

This integration (given what this would involve in joint intellectual property sharing and trust) establishes a new phase in Indo-French defence cooperation on the Rafale platform that commenced earlier with the “Indian specific enhancements” originally implemented that have now led to missile and munition integration from Indian defence industry. This was somewhat hazy till this MOU clarified French commitment on this matter.

It is likely that in future and as a result of this development, the ASTRA, SAAW and any other further weapon integrations and enhancements can be marketed to other Rafale users. This bodes well for the Indian government’s current strategic plan of “Make in India” with its goal to increase local defence production and exports. The future integration of the BrahMos-NG on the Rafale is one such possibility opened by this current integration program.

Of added benefit to both India and France would be the real time and new reference developed regarding the performance of these integrated systems with this particular Rafale combination that may hold a unique tactical dimension and its commensurate unique selling point to other Rafale customers.

India as a relatively new entrant with high ambition in the defence export market will likely benefit by leveraging upon the French defence ecosystem in this manner given the latter’s established, matured and proven networking in many markets of friendly countries that India seeks to sell to as well.

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Revealed at SAHA Expo 2022, the RUAV-724 has some surprisingly impressive specifications and innovative features.

Powered by a turbojet engine, the sleek, cruise missile-like RUAV-724 can travel at a maximum speed of 1,000 km/h. This is significantly faster than current autonomous delivery vehicles and slightly faster than most cargo jets. It will have a cargo capacity of 150 kg. This makes it ideal for the rapid delivery of critical components or weapons. Its range is up to 2,500 km, meaning that it would be capable of resupplying missions deep into contested territory.

The RUAV-724 is capable of vertical take-off with an added booster. This enables deliveries to be dispatched from within tight spaces, such as city streets or naval vessels. This is similar to many kamikaze drones, which use a booster to take off before switching to their main engine. Sortie Cargo has emphasised that the RUAV-724 has an advanced braking system which eliminates the need for a long landing strip.

One of the key features of the RUAV-724 is that it can drop cargo with a parachute. This is a game changer for the resupply of special forces units that are deep in enemy territory or troops who need to be resupplied in rugged terrain. Due to the relatively low cost and the fact that there is no risk of losing pilots, this aircraft is perfect for light cargo delivery in dangerous airspace. It also opens up the possibility for new tactics. For instance, infiltration teams can enter hostile territory without weapons or other gear. When the time comes, they can be quickly and safely supplied by airdrops from the RUAV-724.

All in all, the RUAV-724 is an innovative concept. It combines the speed and appearance of a cruise missile with the reusability and autonomous features of a UAV, yet it functions as a small cargo aircraft. Italy has already signed a contract. The smaller Sortie Cargo RUAV-A has been successfully tested. Meanwhile, Turkey plans to host flight tests of the 6-metre RUAV-724 later in the year.

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In a recent interview on CNN Turk, Roketsan CEO Murat Ikinci stated, “Atmaca and Cakir cruise missiles will be used together in coastal defence”. Indicating that truck-based Atmaca and Cakir cruise missiles will enter the inventory of the Turkish Armed Forces. With the introduction of both missiles, Turkey will have one of the world’s most formidable coastal defence networks.

Though the two missiles are similar, there are some interesting differences. The Atmaca is a long-range (220+ km) anti-ship cruise missile with a 220 kg high-explosive penetrating warhead. It makes use of a variety of sensors to target enemy ships with great precision. Upon approaching enemy ships, it enters ultra sea-skimming mode to avoid detection. It has 3D mission planning capabilities and can disengage, reengage, or engage new targets via data-link. The Atmaca was purpose-built as an anti-ship missile, although a land warfare variant is in development.

In contrast, the Cakir is a smaller missile with a range of 150+ km. Unlike the Atmaca, the Cakir has many variants, including the Cakir AS (anti-ship). The Cakir AS has a warhead weight of 70 kg, which is significantly less than that of the Atmaca. Though as a new generation cruise missile, it has improved capabilities such as the ability to travel in swarms, along with all the features of the Atmaca. The Cakir is also highly versatile due to its compatibility with air platforms and small naval vessels.

The Atmaca and Cakir will form a nearly impenetrable zone stretching more than 200 km away from the Turkish coastline. The differences between the two missiles mean that they can complement each other, with the Atmaca targeting larger vessels from a greater distance and the Cakir as a force multiplier that can harass any vessel which gets past the Atmaca’s line of defence.

With the addition of coastal Atmaca and Cakir batteries, Turkey will further secure its “blue homeland”. Combined with the upcoming Gezgin long-range cruise missile and the Tayfun SRBM, the Atmaca and Cakir will be part of an impressive layered coastal defence network.

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Called Tayfun (Typhoon), the new missile is a short range ballistic missile (SRBM). Built by Roketsan, it joins a growing family of longer range solutions for the Turkish Armed Forces.

Though the unveiling of the Tayfun came as surprise, it was expected that Roketsan would release an evolution of the existing Bora, which had an export version named Khan with a maximum range limited to 280 km. According to CNN Türk the Tayfun successfully hit a target 561 kilometres away, just over twice the range of the Khan tactical ballistic missile. The maximum range is classified, but is expected to be just under 1000 kilometres, typical of SRBMs

An interesting point about the Tayfun is that it may be optimized to hit naval vessels. Several years ago, Turkish defence officials had stated that a second iteration of the Bora was being developed. It was said that the Bora II would not only have a range in excess of 500 km, but would also be capable of striking ships. It is almost certain that “Tayfun” is the new name for the Bora II and that the name which is the Turkish translation of “typhoon” is in reference to its naval attack capabilities.

As the Tayfun has only been officially revealed today, it will continue to be shrouded in mystery for a while. Though it can be speculated that it will have mid-course maneuvering and a quasi-ballistic trajectory similar to the Bora, with a much higher terminal speed. As a strategic weapon, it is unlikely that specifications and capabilities will be fully released to the public.

The post Türkiye tests mysterious Tayfun missile first appeared on DefenceHub.

The Altay tank project was launched in 2007. Intended to replace some of the Turkish army’s aging tanks such as M60s, the Altay is among the only 4th gen main battle tanks. With its advanced fire control system, boron carbide composite armor and Akkor hard-kill APS, the Altay tank is a big step up from current tanks in the Turkish inventory, including the Leopard 2.

In 2018 the German government decided to place an embargo on arms exports to Turkey. As a result, the MTU 1500hp engines that were supposed to power the Altay could not be acquired. This embargo came into place just as the project was being prepared for serial production. Since then, it has been 4 years. Efforts to produce a domestic 1500hp engine have been ongoing, though creating a reliable engine of this power output is not an easy task for a country that is new to producing engines.

Rumours of a South Korean power pack for the Altay started circulating in 2021. These were followed by official announcements soon after. Both sides have confirmed that the Hyundai Doosan Infracore DV27K engine and SNT Dynamics EST15K transmissions have been approved for integration in prototypes.

Now the Seoul office of the Turkish Investment Agency has stated that a contract will be signed soon for the mass production of the Korean engines and transmissions, thus paving the way for the mass production of the Altay tank. Several modifications are expected to be made before mass production commences next year.

Though the vulnerability of tanks has been exposed in recent conflicts, Turkey, like all major militaries is pressing on with its next-generation tank project. The Altay has been one of the most hotly anticipated projects of the Turkish defence industry. As a long-running major project that will transform an aging fleet, there is no going back. With the engines and transmissions almost ready, the Altay could finally enter the inventory as early as next year, ending a long and arduous saga for the Turkish military and defence industry.

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