(MEADS Air and Missile Defence system)

Abstract

Induction of new technologies has dramatically impacted the 21th century battlefield. Many previous ideas and concepts are being revised, reassessed or even being abandoned altogether. Significant increase in the precision, range and lethality of indirect fires, proliferation of highly capable cruise and ballistic missiles, affordability of destructive air power, coupled with ever more capable ISTAR complexes (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance) leveraging ubiquitous availability of sensors has made Force Protection an extremely difficult and challenging endeavour. As the most prominent aspect of Force Protection, In today’s operational environment the importance of Air and Missile defence cannot be overstated. This article analyses the Bangladesh Army’s need for Air and Missile defence and recommends course of action.

Introduction

In the strategic context of Bangladesh Armed Forces, due to lack of sufficient numbers of modern 4th gen fighter interceptors in the fleet, significant gap and lack of balance in air power prevails between BAF and other regional Air Forces. Making joint Active Air and Missile Defence, the primary viable mean of effective defensive counterair in the short to medium term. Moreover in the long term, when it comes to fighting a conventionally and numerically superior adversary against whom Air superiority cannot be achieved, Active Air and Missile Defence (AMD) capabilities will become the lifeline of the friendly formations.

And today for the Army specifically, to ensure Force Protection against traditional fixed and rotary wing threats, cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as to address the increasing RAM and UAS hazards on the battlefield, adequate Air and Missile defence is imperative.

Definitions

Defensive Counterair: defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace.

Force Protection: Measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment, materiel, operations, and activities from threats and hazards in order to preserve freedom of action and operational effectiveness thereby contributing to mission success.(AJP 3.14)

Air and Missile Defence (AMD) is the most prominent part of it. It is defined as the direct active and passive defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and ballistic missile threats against friendly forces and assets. (JP 3-01)

Active AMD: Active AMD is direct defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and BM threats against friendly forces and assets. Active AMD includes AD and ballistic missile defence (BMD).

AD: AD is defensive measures designed to destroy attacking aircraft and aerodynamic missiles, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. It includes the use of aircraft, SAMs, antiaircraft artillery (AAA), CO, EW (including directed energy), multiple sensors, and other available weapons/capabilities. AD includes defence against CMs and UASs.

BMD: BMD is defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy BMs, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. Integration of BMD systems will allow for a defence in depth, with the potential for multiple engagements that increase the probability for success. (JP 3-01)

Though not included in the definition of active AMD operations, counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) is a fundamental part of active AMD. C-RAM operations are defensive measures to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of rocket, artillery, and mortar (RAM) threats. For, simplicity sake, air, ballistic, and RAM threats are generally referred to as “air and missile threats” hereafter. (FM 3-01)

Passive AMD. Passive AMD is all measures, other than active AMD, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and BM threats against friendly forces and assets. These measures include detection, warning, camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, hardening, and the use of protective construction.

As mentioned above, active AMD is embedded in the defensive counterair portion of the joint counterair operational framework.(JP 3-01)

Bangladesh Army’s Active Air Defence capability requirement.

Current Air Defence Doctrine of Bangladesh limits Army’s Air Defence capabilities to MRSAM class. Only Bangladesh Air Force can procure and possess missiles beyond 30 km.1 Thus, it effectively puts long range AD and BMD within operational responsibilities of BAF. Hence for Army’s active AD, we will focus on MRSAM, VSHORAD/MANPADS and C-RAM capabilities in this article.

Currently, Bangladesh army has 43rd and 44rd SHORAD Regiments equipped with Chinese FM-90 short range Air defence systems.2 Additionally, Army has one battery of operational Oerlikon Skyguard® 3 VSHORAD. Commissioned with Adhoc 48 Air Defence (AD) Regiment Artillery.3 Another battery is presumably on order. Apart from that, Army has procured two batteries of CS/AA3 system that are in commission with Adhoc 57 Air Defence (AD) Regiment Artillery.4

(Bangladesh Army Air Defence Artillery FM-90)

However, these numbers are not nearly enough to conduct sufficient active air and missile defence operation to protect all ten Divisional formations and critical assets of Bangladesh Army in a full fledged conflict. Due to budgetary constraints and political reasons army has a tendency to buy a very small numbers of state of art weapons to declare modernization and then move on. Such as, Oerlikon Skyguard 3 VSHORAD can be considered best in its class, however, just one or two batteries are going to have very little effect in a large conventional ground combat operation. Army must extensively prioritize Air defence Artillery modernisation as it did with amor and mechanised infantry modernisation in the previous decade. (For reference, from 2011 to 2020 Army has procured 500+ APCs and MRAPs. Extensively modernised its existing tank fleet and procured two regiments of new state of the art tanks. MBT-2000 and VT-5).

MRSAM requirement

Russo-Ukraine conflict has widely demonstrated that, to effectively combat enemy cruise missile, medium and large UAS/UCAS, fixed & rotary wing threats in order to protect friendly formations and critical assets, state of art area defence capable MRSAM systems are crucial. Western supplied MRSAM systems such as NASAMS and IRIS-T SLM has shown remarkable performance.5 One NASAMS unit has reportedly shot down more than 250 targets alone.6

(HISAR O+)

So far Army lacks any MRSAM system in active service. However, recently it appears under the MRSAM evaluation process the service has taken steps in the right direction.7 It has been reported that Army has ordered HISAR O+ MRSAM from Türkiye in 2021 under a billion dollars contract.8 We highly recommend Army continue its MRSAM purchases in batches. It must raise at least 4x MRSAM Regiments by 2030 and 8x by 2035.

VSHORAD/MANPADS requirement

MANPADS is an integrated part of maneuverer formation’s air defence. Currently Bangladesh Army operates several types of MANPADS. Including FN-16, QW-2 & recently procured more advanced QW-18A. Additionally, Army has taken initiative to manufacture MANPADS locally and open a domestic production line within BOF to fulfil future requirement. However, it should be treated with caution.9 Previously, a similar attempt in mid 2010s with local assembly of FN-16 has failed. But if this one were to succeed, it would require extensive cooperation and successful ToT from International security partners. This project, if realised, will not only enhance the domestic defence industry and build local expertise, but will also offer flexibility in procurement and help to save foreign currencies. Alternatively, if this fails to deliver, army should have contingency plan to procure MANPADS off the shelf in sufficient numbers for future requirement.

(Roketsan Sungur MANPADS)

C-UAS and C-RAM requirements

C-UAS: Today proliferation of small unmanned areal systems (UAS) has evolved into a much more significant and dynamic threat than it was previously anticipated. Ukraine conflict is demonstrating how small, cheap (and mostly) commercial drones are procured in tens of thousands and fielded with platoon and even done to squad level formations. These are creating unprecedented sensor density and offering dramatic localised situational awareness to the smallest units. Something like that was almost unthinkable just two decades ago. To make it worse, these quadcopter, Octocopter, and FPV UAS has been increasingly adopted and modified to carry Grenades and small ammunitions. And they are accurately hitting entrenched positions, infantry and armoured vehicles.10 Which has become a major problem for force protection.

Additionally, more sophisticated and capable purpose-built loitering ammunitions like Switchblade-600 and Lancet-3 with longer range, endurance and higher lethality are being extensively used against soft and armoured targets to a great effect. Moreover, high-end version of these loitering ammunitions like Israeli Harop, with more payload, hours of endurance and ability to traverse hundreds of km has been able to hit high value targets (HVT) throughout the adversary’s operational depth, as seen in 2020 Nagarno-Karabakh war and ongoing Ukraine-Russia conflict.11

Last but not the least, tactical UAVs like Russian Orlan-10 and Ukrainian Shark are greatly enhancing the field commander’s situational awareness by providing persistence ISR throughout the depth and breadth of the battlefield. These systems are cost effective and easy to produce in numbers, thus attritable. Consequentially, this class of UAV along with smaller ones has become a significant force multiplier for the traditional Artillery, enabling a highly devastating Reconnaissance-strike-complex (RSC) by providing target acquisition with unprecedented scale and accuracy.12

Even though these are yet to pick up on trends fully in South Asia, it would be wrong to assume that other regional armed forces would fail to keep up with the unprecedented changes that are taking place today. Indian army has already began investing gradually in small indigenous UAS and loitering ammunitions. Previously IAF bought undisclosed numbers of Harop loitering ammunition from Israel.13

Soon Bangladesh Army’s Air defence Artillery will need to address these newly emerging threats. Although, there is No doubt EW will play a large role in defending against these, nevertheless kinetic interceptors are essential. However, Recent conflicts in Ukraine and Nagarno-karabakh has demonstrated the inability of traditional Air defence systems (even the advanced ones) to adequately address the threat posed by small UAVs and loitering ammunitions. Even without taking into account the difficulties to detect, track and identify these threats due to their small RCS and very low IR signature, a very simple cost-benefit analysis will show the serious inefficiency of traditional of defence systems. A short range interceptor or MANPADS cost higher than these UAS. For comparison, loitering ammunitions like Lancet or Orlan-10 type UAVs only cost around $35k-100k. Let alone smaller quadcopters and FPV UAS, which costs much less. Usually between $1000-10k. On the other hand, an FIM-92 Stinger MANPADS reportedly costing up to $400k today.

Although world leading armed forces are seeking solutions to this problem in next generation directed energy weapons, those are at least a decade away from being fielded in large numbers. Besides, with the limited budget it has, Army is unlikely to get its hand on such high-end laser weapon systems in sufficient numbers. Alternatively, cold war Era concept of radar guided AAA guns are getting renewed attention. These VSHOARAD are cost effective when dealing with emerging UAS and loitering ammunitions threats. Ukraine has used and continue to use its large numbers of donated Gepard SPAAG to a great effect against shahed-136 and other Russian UAS.14

C-RAM: As discussed above, the ubiquitous availability of highly attritable and high-fidelity surveillance and reconnaissance assets, from electronic and multispectral sensing, to video feeds from UAVs, leaves little room to hide.

Even though it is rare that any one weapon or technology will alter the totality of the battlefield, as results are dependent upon so many different factors that defy effective centralised control, the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) provided to Ukraine have disrupted this trend and decisively shaped the battlefield by engaging Russia’s logistics, command and control(C2) nodes, and troop concentrations through much of the Russian Armed Force’s (RuAF) operational depth. This has prevented the RuAF from concentrating and massing artillery fire in a way that the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) could not match, disrupted RuAF attempts to concentrate forces for offensives, and made command of Russian units a risky endeavour. Without the above effects, the AFU would have suffered significantly greater casualties and setbacks. The value of GMLRS is best understood through a combination of software, hardware and tactics.15

Additionally, AFU used US supplied Exculiber 155mm high precision round to strike Russian HVT in the rear. These tube and Rocket artillery capabilities are being continuously improved.

In potential future conflicts, competent adversary can leverage long range precision IDF to similar effects against Bangladesh Army through robust kill chain and capable Reconnaissance-strike complex. Evidently, there is no sanctuary in modern warfare. The enemy can strike throughout operational depth. Dispersion and concealment of ammunitions stocks, command and control (C2) nodes are critical to its survivability, nevertheless active C-RAM capability is imperative.

(Aselsan Korkut SPAAG)

Today’s New generation Self propelled AAA guns meets the requirements and provide effective solution to C-UAS and C-RAM as it combines both capabilities in a single system. For example, Reinmetall Skyranger-35 and Aselsan Korkut. (C-RAM capability for the later is still in development) Additionally, these systems have excellent utility against Cruise missiles and other areal threats in point defence role.

Even though Bangladesh Army has already bought Skygaurd 3 Air defence system from Reinmetall, it is unlikely to afford something expensive as Skyranger-35. However, Aselsan Korkut is more cost effective and may offer a better solution to the Army. The service must look to procure 20x systems in class by 2035.

Air and Missile Defence integration requirement.

Proper integration within service and between services is crucial to the operational success of Air and Missile defence. Integration maximizes the capabilities of individual systems and compensate for its vulnerabilities by combining different sensors, interceptors and decision makers into a single network enabled redundant architecture. Each system having access to the combined air picture allows Early Warning, better readiness, and efficient engagement of threats.

As of now Bangladesh Army lacks any initiative of its own to integrate its sensors. However, BAF has previously initiated a project for its own air and missile defence’s system integration. The system manufactured by Artemis from UK has entered service this year. It is expected to support multiple protocols. that means the system will have the capability to integrate equipments from different manufactures.16 Though, BAF has procured only one system so far.

Army’s recent Re-evaluation of Local Warning Radar (LWR) notice suggest that, the service is looking for within and inter service integration of its air defence assets.17 To facilitate smooth joint integration, Army may look to procure the same system as BAF. And both services should look to procure multiple of them to gain operational flexibility and ensure redundancy and survivability.

EW capability requirement

Russo-Ukraine war has seen widespread employment of Electronic Warfare capabilities in both offensive and defensive actions. EW has proven to be the most effective and primary mean to counter small UAS. Reportedly, Russian EW capabilities several months into the conflict has been able to knock out 90% of Ukrainian UAS.18

Similarly, it has demonstrated high performance against US supplied precision weapons such as Excalibur, HIMARS and JDAM.

By the second year, according to a senior Ukrainian military official. “everything ended: the Russians deployed electronic warfare, disabled satellite signals, and HIMARS became completely ineffective, this ineffectiveness led to the point where a very expensive shell was used” increasingly to strike lower-priority targets. Though Kyiv still considers its HIMARS rockets valuable, but Russian jamming can cause them to miss a target by 50 feet or more. “When it’s, for example, a pontoon bridge … but there’s a 10-meter deviation, it ends up in the water,” another Ukrainian official said.

A battalion commander, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to do so publicly, described flying a reconnaissance drone in foggy conditions last year in Bakhmut to track a HIMARS strike on a Russian position. On his screen, the commander watched in dismay as each rocket missed.19

Additionally, Excalibur precision artillery round initially had an efficiency rate of 70% hitting targets when first used in Ukraine. However, after six weeks efficiency declined to only 6% as the Russians adapted their electronic warfare systems to counter it.20

One of the clear lessons of Ukriane conflict in large scale conventional warfighting is the utility and effectiveness of EW in Air and Missile Defence. It is imperative that Bangladesh Army invest sufficiently in its EW capability and acquire sophisticated GNSS jamming technology.

Passive Air and Missile Defence capability requirement.

Passive Air and Missile Defence techniques are crucial to the survivability of friendly formations and critical assets. Apart from the real possibility of existing active AMD systems being overwhelmed due to focused and saturated attack by the enemy, most Armed forces around the world often lack sufficient numbers of AMD systems to provide active protection to all of its formations. Specially when it comes to BMD and C-RAM. And for Bangladesh Armed forces, it lacks any type of active BMD or C-RAM capability as of now. Hence for Army, passive AMD is the only measure to preserve and protect its formations against these threats. Additionally, its AD capability against air breathing targets is significantly insufficient. Thus, making Passive AMD indispensable across the spectrum.

Passive Air and Missile Defence measures includes–

(1) Detection and Early Warning. Timely detection and warning of air and missile threats provide reaction time to friendly forces to seek shelter or take appropriate actions.(JP 3-01) Specifically when it comes to BMD, long range land based sensors detects the threat when it appears on the horizon, tracks it and calculate the point of impact, subsequently generates alarms. Timely dissemination of these warnings require robust, secure and fast automated communication systems.

Bangladesh army is yet to have any long range sensing capability of its own to detect and track air and missile threats at ranges. Though, Local Warning Radar acquisition initiative is set to change that. As of now, BAF operates variety of long range state of art AESA sensors. That includes, 2x GM403, 1x RAT 31LD, 2x REL-4, 1x JH-16 & 1x JY-11B.21 These system are capable of effectively tracking air and missile threats at ranges. Proper Inter-service AMD system integration would enable Army to leverage these sensors to boost its early warning capability.

(Thales GM400 long range AESA surveillance and early warning radar)

(2) Mobility. Mobility reduces vulnerability and increases survivability by complicating enemy surveillance and reconnaissance effort to pin point locations of targets.(JP 3-01)

In today’s operational environment, anything slow with a sizable signature has become increasingly vulnerable due to unprecedented sensor density (offering persistent reconnaissance across the depth and breadth of the battlefield) coupled with ubiquitous availability of indirect precision fires. This is true for the existing assets and traditional formations across the echolens.

To remain competitive and to preserve its combat power, army must introduce necessary organizational changes and facilitate advanced and adequate trainings to its personnel to enable higher battlefield mobility and agility of its units and formations.

(3) Camouflage and Concealment. Practice of visual signature reduction measures that can “hide” or deny accuracy in locating friendly targets/target systems. These measures may be conducted continuously or in response to specific warnings. Timely intelligence concerning the overflight by enemy satellite and aircraft collection systems is important to the effort. Those measures also may be coupled with deception measures to further complicate chances of effective enemy attacks. The employment of obscurants can negate the effectiveness and/or accuracy of attacks.(JP 3-01)

(Saab’s Barracuda camouflage system on an armoured vehicle)

Modern state of art Multi-spectral camouflage system offers a degree of protection against visual, IR and radar detection. Army should look to procure them in sufficient numbers from international partners and companies that are offering cost effective solutions.

(4) Deception. Deception misleads adversaries by manipulating, distorting, or falsifying friendly actions. Deception may be used to cause an enemy to waste munitions on false targets, deceive their combat assessment process, and falsely influence their decision makers by feeding their intelligence collectors what appears to be credible information. Deception may deny the enemy the ability to gain correct tactical, operational, and strategic information when using their reconnaissance and surveillance systems.(JP 3-01)

(5) Dispersal. Dispersal reduces target vulnerability by decreasing concentration making individual targets less lucrative. Combined with mobility and deception, dispersal increases enemy uncertainty as to whether a particular location is occupied and, if so, whether it will be occupied when the attack is executed.(JP 3-01)

Ability to fight dispersed effectively requires extensive training preparation and adaptation of Mission Command philosophy. Which army needs to accommodate within its training processes.

(6) Hardening and Redundancy.

(a) Hardening. Valuable assets and their shelters must be hardened to protect them against Air and Missile attacks.

(b) Redundancy. A principal means of preserving combat power is duplication of critical nodes, capabilities, and systems that are particularly vulnerable to air and missile attack and for which other passive measures may be less appropriate.(JP 3-01)

Notes–

1. REQUIREMENT OF LOMAD AND HIMAD MISSILE FOR BANGLADESH ARMY: SUITABLE OPTIONS FOR INDUCTION. (by Lieutenant Colonel Tanveer Ahmed, psc, G+) Mirpur Papers volume 28, Issue 32.​

2. Bangladesh Army chief raises flags of 3 new artillery units, Dhaka Tribune.​

3. NEWLY ADDITION IN BANGLADESH ARMY ORELIKON RADAR CONTROLLED GUN TEST FIRING HELD AT COXBAZAR, ISPR.​

4. Bangladesh Army test-fires CS/AA3 anti-aircraft guns, Janes.​

5. ES&T Redaktion (6 June 2024). “ILA 2024: „Close to 100% hit rate” für IRIS-T SLM”. esut.de (in German).​

6. Story of Commander of Norwegian-American NASAMS. The Baron Unit destroyed over 250 Russian missiles & drones – United24​

7.“Evaluation of Medium Range Surface to Air Missile System for Bangladesh Army” (PDF). DGDP.

8.তুরস্কের সঙ্গে সম্পর্ক তলানি থেকে শিখরে, আজকের পত্রিকা / সমরাস্ত্র-কেনাকাটায়-কৌশলী-বাংলাদেশ, সমকাল.

9. https://dgdp.gov.bd/dgdp/AP_TEN/notice/729.pdf

10. FPV drones are defining the battlefield, WavellRoom.

11. Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict: How Baku destroyed Russian S-300s with Israeli suicide drones, Middle East Eye.

12. Ukraine’s Lessons for Future Combat: Unmanned Aerial Systems and Deep Strike. USAWC Press.

13.“Indian air force orders Harop loitering munitions”. Flightglobal.com.

14. Gepard: “Predator” of the Ukrainian air defense, MILITARNYI.

15. MLRS and the Totality of the Battlefield, RUSI.

16. ENHANCEMENT OF AIR DEFENCE CAPABILITY OF BANGLADESH THROUGH UTILIZATION OF BANGABANDHU SATELLITE, Wing Commander M Mahfuzur Rahman, Engineering. Mirpur Papers, Volume 26, Issue 30.

17. Re-evaluation of Local Warning Radar (LWR) notice, DGDP.

18. Russia’s Electronic-Warfare Troops Knocked Out 90 Percent Of Ukraine’s Drones, Forbes.

19. Russian jamming leaves some high-tech U.S. weapons ineffective in Ukraine, The Washington Post.

20. https://www.congress.gov/118/meeting/house/116957/witnesses/HHRG-118-AS35-Wstate-PattD-20240313.pdf

21.https://mod.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/mod.portal.gov.bd/page/7afd70bc_7a61_41e6_9437_c38258a525e8/Air_Force.pd / https://www.latribune.fr/entreprise…es-radars-high-tech-au-bangladesh-852399.html

​

The post Bangladesh Army Modernization Priorities: Part I first appeared on DefenceHub.

The Altay tank project was launched in 2007. Intended to replace some of the Turkish army’s aging tanks such as M60s, the Altay is among the only 4th gen main battle tanks. With its advanced fire control system, boron carbide composite armor and Akkor hard-kill APS, the Altay tank is a big step up from current tanks in the Turkish inventory, including the Leopard 2.

In 2018 the German government decided to place an embargo on arms exports to Turkey. As a result, the MTU 1500hp engines that were supposed to power the Altay could not be acquired. This embargo came into place just as the project was being prepared for serial production. Since then, it has been 4 years. Efforts to produce a domestic 1500hp engine have been ongoing, though creating a reliable engine of this power output is not an easy task for a country that is new to producing engines.

Rumours of a South Korean power pack for the Altay started circulating in 2021. These were followed by official announcements soon after. Both sides have confirmed that the Hyundai Doosan Infracore DV27K engine and SNT Dynamics EST15K transmissions have been approved for integration in prototypes.

Now the Seoul office of the Turkish Investment Agency has stated that a contract will be signed soon for the mass production of the Korean engines and transmissions, thus paving the way for the mass production of the Altay tank. Several modifications are expected to be made before mass production commences next year.

Though the vulnerability of tanks has been exposed in recent conflicts, Turkey, like all major militaries is pressing on with its next-generation tank project. The Altay has been one of the most hotly anticipated projects of the Turkish defence industry. As a long-running major project that will transform an aging fleet, there is no going back. With the engines and transmissions almost ready, the Altay could finally enter the inventory as early as next year, ending a long and arduous saga for the Turkish military and defence industry.

The post Altay Tank Engine Deal Set to be Signed first appeared on DefenceHub.

The Brazilian government is interested in buying 222 Javelin missiles (with disposable launch tubes) along with 33 reusable Javelin Command Launch Units (CLU). So far the Javelin is in use in 22 militaries, including Ukraine, which has used it effectively against Russian armor. Along with Brazil, Albania, Latvia and Thailand are also waiting to receive their first orders.

The FGM-148 Javelin is a fire and forget ATGM capable of targeting the tanks from above, negating the advantages of heavy armor on the hull and sides of the turret.

The post Brazil Given Green Light To Buy Javelin Missiles first appeared on DefenceHub.

The company is building an MEO satellite data relay system, using both radio-frequency and optical links. According to SpaceLink, the agreement will include close collaboration with the USASMDC, which will allow SpaceLink to discern the requirements of the US Army, thus speeding up adjustments to the program. As part of the agreement, SpaceLink will provide modelling and simulation tools.

Ultimately, the goal of the agreement is to allow blistering fast data transfer to troops on the ground. By relaying data or images from other satellites, the system can provide critical information to army personnel within minutes or seconds, instead of hours. SpaceLink claims that they are ready for production. The first four satellites are geared for launch by late 2024.

The post SpaceLink Signs Data-Relay Agreement With US Army first appeared on DefenceHub.

Many have proclaimed that the end of the tank is already here. Syria, Karabakh and now Ukraine. All three theatres showed just how vulnerable tanks are in modern combat. But tanks serve an important role. They provide powerful, fast, cost-efficient direct fire capabilities. Their versatility enables them to eliminate a variety of targets such as other MBTs, fast-moving vehicles, infantry and defensive fighting positions. In conventional warfare, armoured personnel carriers will often require the protection of tanks.

What Threats do Tanks Face?

There is no denying that tanks are more vulnerable than ever. They face many threats. Four, in particular, have proven to be especially dangerous in recent conflicts.

• Wire-guided/laser beam riding anti-tank missiles: Have been in use for decades. Widely used in the war in Syria. Needs to be manually guided by the operator. Examples: BGM-71 TOW, 9M133 Kornet
• Predicted line of sight anti-tank missiles: A relatively new concept. The operator tracks the tank for a few seconds. Based on the speed, direction and distance of the target, a trajectory is automatically calculated by the onboard computer, giving the missile a high probability of a successful strike. Examples: NLAW
• Infrared-guided anti-tank missiles: Able to lock on to the infrared signature of a tank. Once fired, the operator can immediately seek cover (fire-and-forget). Examples: FGM-148 Javelin
• Drone-launched laser-guided micro-munitions: A drone drops a gliding micro-munition, which is guided by an IR laser. Examples: MAM-L

What are active protection systems and how can they help?

Active protection systems (APS) are countermeasure systems that can automatically neutralize imminent threats. Active protection systems fall into two categories. Soft-kill and hard-kill. Soft-kill APS blind or confuse the sensors of missiles or their launch platforms. Whereas hard-kill APS launch countermunitions to destroy, deflect or slow down incoming projectiles.

Ideally, both types of APS should be installed for maximum survivability. However, it should be noted that soft-kill APS are far from a guaranteed solution. Modern sensors can be highly resistant to jamming or trickery. Furthermore, PLOS missiles such as the NLAW cannot be defeated by soft-kill APS. Not to mention unguided rockets, which are completely impervious to soft-kill countermeasures. Regardless of the drawbacks, many major militaries are pursuing soft-kill APS for their tanks. The prevalence of laser-guided and IR-homing missiles in today’s battlefield makes soft-kill countermeasures increasingly necessary. Multispectral smoke and laser dazzling can trick the incoming missile/munition, making it miss the tank or even veer off in another direction.

As aforementioned, hard-kill active protection systems are designed to counteract incoming projectiles via psychical interception, destroying, deflecting or detonating them in mid-air. Because of this, they can defeat unguided projectiles, as well as PLOS missiles such as the NLAW. As a result, hard-kill APS are far more dependable when facing a plethora of potential threats. They can protect a tank in asymmetric warfare, unlike soft-kill systems. There is, however, a major drawback. Hard-kill APS systems can be a serious hazard to nearby infantry. This may require a change in tactics.

Despite the obvious benefits of hard-kill APS, there are only a handful of nations developing them. Israel had installed Trophy systems back in 2010. Trophy APS proved itself the following year by foiling a missile attack on an IDF Merkava MK IV. Since then, it has stopped numerous attacks. In fact, it has had zero reported false alarms and has prevented every single attack on IDF vehicles fitted with it. The US military has already installed hundreds of Trophy APS; meanwhile, Germany is in the process of integrating them on their Leopard 2 tanks.

Interestingly, it was the Soviet Union that had the first operational hard-kill APS. Named “Drozd”, it was used in Afghanistan, where it stopped the majority of RPG attacks. Due to its complexity and the danger posed to nearby troops, it was shelved. It was soon to be replaced with explosive reactive armour (ERA). In fact, to this day, Russian tanks make heavy use of ERA. Although ERA has the same basic purpose as hard-kill APS, it isn’t nearly as effective. This is primarily down to the trigger distance. Hard-kill APS can weaken, deflect, destroy or prematurely ignite an incoming projectile from a distance. ERA, on the other hand, is triggered upon contact, meaning that they have little effect on kinetic energy rounds or tandem warheads.

Conclusion

Hard-kill countermeasures are by far the most effective way to protect tanks. Militaries should install them on tanks and all other armoured vehicles. Systems capable of counteracting top attack munitions should be a top priority. A combination of hard-kill and soft-kill active countermeasures should significantly increase the survivability of armoured vehicles.

The post War in Ukraine Highlights the Urgent Need for Hard-Kill APS first appeared on DefenceHub.

Roketsan, Turkey’s largest missile & rocket company, has added the 4th addition to its ATGM family. The Karaok will be Turkey’s first domestic shoulder-launched ATGM. Like the Javelin, it has a standard range of 2.5km and uses its infrared seeker for fire and forget function. Once the operator fires it, there is no need to guide it manually, the operator can seek cover immediately. This has proven immensely effective in Ukraine, where the Javelin has been used by mobile infantry to ambush tanks and other vehicles.

Once introduced, the Karaok will be a key component in the modernization of the Turkish military. Turkish vehicles already carry new generation ATGMs. However, shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons in the Turkish inventory currently lack any guidance. Therefore, the Karaok will be a major step forward for the lethality of Turkish infantry forces.

The Karaok recently passed its firing tests. It is expected to enter the Turkish Armed Forces inventory this year.

The post Roketsan Karaok to enter Turkish army inventory this year first appeared on DefenceHub.

Firstly, let’s look at why tank cannons are still relevant in the age of guided missiles.

• Velocity: Rounds fired from tank barrels are much faster than ATGMs. For instance, the Rheinmetall Rh-120 can launch rounds at over 1700 meters per second. In comparison, the AGM-114 Hellfire travels at around 450 meters per second. Although unguided, there are circumstances where the speed of tank rounds is advantageous.​
• Cost: The price of each projectile adds up. Particularly in prolonged wars. Tank rounds will always be much cheaper than guided missiles.​
• Versatility: HE(high-explosive) tank rounds can effectively destroy differing targets. These include vehicles, infantry clusters, hideouts, buildings, barricades, etc. Whereas most guided missiles are only suitable for use against other land vehicles. General-purpose guided missiles exist, but they perform best when fired from air platforms. Besides, not only do they cost a lot more, but they don’t provide a significant advantage in a line-of-sight ground-to-ground situation.​
• Resistance: ATGMs are highly susceptible to hard and soft-kill APS. Tank rounds, meanwhile, are impervious to soft-kill countermeasures. Most hard-kill systems can also struggle to disable an incoming tank round.​
• No minimum range: In some situations, the enemy is much closer than anticipated. Guided missiles have a minimum range requirement, which can prove to be an annoyance. Tank rounds, on the other hand, can eliminate targets that are a stone’s throw away. Literally.​

The issue with current guns and their proposed successors​

Today’s MBTs use 120mm or 125mm cannons. Their projectiles are capable of penetrating older tanks. However, decent current generation MBTs can withstand a frontal impact. As main battle tanks are designed primarily for conventional warfare, they must successfully engage and defeat tanks belonging to the opposing force. For this reason, military decision-makers are looking at 130mm, 140mm or even larger calibres for a solution.

Even a minor increase from 120mm to 130mm can provide a 50% increase in performance. The extra weight aids with penetration. However, this comes at the cost of space, and consequently, total round capacity. The roughly 10kg increase in weight, means that without an autoloader, loading the gun will be slower.

With more propellant, a 130mm round can travel marginally faster than a 120mm round. But the improvement would be nearly unnoticeable.

An increase in diameter may indeed be the most simple solution. But apart from the superior penetration, it’s hardly an upgrade?

Electrothermal-Chemical (ETC) Cannons

Electrothermal-chemical guns use plasma to ignite the propellant. This has several key advantages:

• Increased rate of expansion​
• Muzzle energy increases​
• Greater muzzle velocity​
• More predictable igniting pattern​
• The utilisation of advanced and higher density propellants​
• Existing tank barrels and rounds can be used (saves resources)​

Electrothermal-chemical guns can be the next giant leap in cannon technology. Large bore guns need an evolutionary step forward, and the many advantages provided by ETC technology is phenomenal.

Though the technology is in its infancy, it’s theoretically feasible for ETC guns to launch projectiles at almost railgun-like speeds. High-density propellants lit with plasma will fully ignite at a fast rate. They will also burn in a more predictable pattern. Meaning more energy will be generated, leading to projectiles travelling at blistering speeds.

Unlike railguns, which require large batteries to operate, ETC guns don’t need nearly as much power. Current tank barrels are compatible with ETC technology, which further increases the viability and cost-effectiveness of ETC guns.

Several ignition methods exist. The preferred method is FLARE (Flashboard Large Area Emitter). However, its complexity has made it the main focus of R&D efforts on ETC technology. There is a good reason for this, however. In the XM291 tests, the FLARE ignitor launched rounds with 17 MJ of muzzle energy (with 120mm rounds). Though already impressive, further advances could see this number rise. That puts the ETC 120mm barrel variant of the XM291 well within 140mm territory in terms of muzzle energy.

Conclusion

Electrothermal-chemical guns are an evolutionary step forward. Though they offer a plethora of benefits, there are also some drawbacks. Including the need to integrate systems that take up precious space inside cramped tanks. However, the biggest hurdle is the hesitance to dedicate resources to the R&D of ETC technology. Whether it’s the simplicity of switching to larger barrels, or the allure of railguns, ETC technology is almost unknown in the defence community.

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